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ABSTRACT
Pervasive computing is beginning to offer the potential to
re-think and re-define how technology can support human
memory augmentation. For example, the emergence of wide-
spread pervasive sensing, personal recording technologies
and systems for quantified self are creating an environment
in which it is possible to capture fine-grained traces of many
aspects of human activity. Contemporary psychology the-
ories suggest that these traces can then be used to manipu-
late our ability to recall, i.e. to both re-enforce and attenu-
ate human memories. In this paper we consider the privacy
and security implications of using pervasive computing to
augment human memory. We describe a number of scenar-
ios, outline the key architectural building blocks and identify
entirely new types of security and privacy threats – namely
those related to data security (experience provenance), data
management (establishing new paradigms for digital mem-
ory ownership), data integrity (memory attenuation and re-
call induced forgetting), and bystander privacy. Together
these threats present compelling research challenges for the
pervasive computing research community.
1. INTRODUCTION
Technology has always had a direct impact on how
and what humans remember. This impact is both in-
evitable and fundamental – technology radically changes
the nature and scale of the cues that we can preserve
outside our own memory in order to trigger recall. Such
change is not new – we have seen the transition from
story-telling to written books, from paintings to pho-
tographs to digital images and from individual diaries
to collective social networks. However, in recent years
three separate strands of technology have developed to
the extent that collectively they open up entirely new
ways of augmenting human memory:
1. near-continuous collection of memory cues has be-
come possible through the use of technologies such
as Microsoft’s SenseCam [9], social networks and
interaction logs.
2. advances in data storage and processing now en-
ables widespread mining of stored cues for proac-
tive presentation, both in terms of cues collected
by an individual and in terms of complex networks
of related cues contributed by others.
3. the presence of ubiquitous displays (both in the en-
vironment and via personal devices such as Google
Glass
TM
) provides many new opportunities for dis-
playing memory cues to trigger recall.
The result is that it is now feasible to use pervasive
sensing to capture a very large amount of data on an
individual’s experiences, i.e. their memories, and then
to use pervasive display technologies to trigger recall
of these memories. Contemporary psychology theories
suggest that these traces can then be used to both re-
enforce and attenuate human memories [1]. This opens
up the possibility of a very wide range of new applica-
tions for memory augmentation devices but it also raises
new privacy and security concerns. Traditional research
in this area has principally been concerned with pri-
vacy concerns for either third-parties captured in video
footage or individuals wishing to anonymise their lo-
cation traces. In this paper we discuss a range of new
security and privacy threats that target manipulation of
an individual’s memories. Our contributions are three-
fold:
1. We highlight pervasive memory augmentation as
an important area of future work for the commu-
nity and provide a series of compelling application
examples.
2. We describe the core architectural building blocks
of a future pervasive memory augmentation eco-
system.
3. Based on our architecture we identify a number of
privacy and security threats that provide research
challenges for the community. These threats span
a range of areas including data security (expe-
rience provenance), data management (establish-
ing new paradigms for digital memory ownership),
data integrity (memory attenuation and recall in-
duced forgetting), and bystander privacy.
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Note that we do not claim to have solutions to the
challenges that we highlight – the field of memory aug-
mentation is still sufficiently new that we believe there
is significant value in laying out the potential problem
space upon which others can build. Indeed, we hope
that this article provides a starting point for significant
community research activity in the area of security and
privacy protection for pervasive memory systems.
2. FUTUREMEMORYAUGMENTATION SYS-
TEMS IN USE
We envisage an environment in which augmented mem-
ory systems make everyday use of peripheral, ambient
multi-media content – delivered via large wall-mounted
displays, smartphone wallpapers, or wearable in-eye pro-
jectors – to intelligently integrate, display, and enable
the review of life-relevant personal data. Future mem-
ory augmentation systems will integrate information ac-
tively entered by the user (e.g., calendar entries, pho-
tos) with additional relevant data collected automati-
cally through a multitude of capture technologies, in ac-
cordance with the user’s privacy preferences. Through
the ambient review of their activities over a range of
timescales users will be able to actively manage their
memories: they will be able to enhance the later acces-
sibility of needed information, whilst attenuating the re-
call of unwanted information. Therefore, such systems
not only bring together advances in capture systems
and display technologies to provide cues and hints that
prompt humans to remember, but also provide tools
that allows users to more actively manage the accessi-
bility of their memories in the future. Pervasive mem-
ory augmentation systems have the potential to revo-
lutionise the way we use memory in a wide range of
application domains.
2.1 Behaviour Change
Effecting behaviour change is an important objective
in many important areas such as health (e.g., lifestyle
changes such as increasing exercise or stopping smok-
ing) and sustainable transport (e.g., encouraging peo-
ple to make more environmentally-friendly transport
choices). Unfortunately, despite good intentions, many
people experience difficulty in implementing planned
behaviour: for example, it is well known that many
people are reluctant to make a trip to the gym despite
paying large gym membership fees. Psychological the-
ory stresses that intentional behaviours are more likely
to be implemented when individuals are reminded of
their own attitude towards such behaviours (e.g., the
positive gains that will result), and the attitudes of
significant others to the behaviour (what loved ones,
family, friends, peers, and society in general think of
the behaviour and its outcomes). In addition, realis-
tic scheduling is important: planned behaviour is more
likely to be performed if it is timetabled with the tran-
sition from immediately preceding activities in mind.
Finally, behaviour is more likely if it is perceived to be
more achievable and more enjoyable. Pervasive mem-
ory augmentation can help with the realistic scheduling
and reminding of the planned activities, and can re-
mind people at the point at which decision making is
necessary (e.g., at the planned time to visit the gym) of
the positive benefits from the behaviour, the previous
good experience of the behaviour and the progress that
is being made.
2.2 Learning
Pervasive memory augmentation technologies can also
be used as part of a learning environment. In partic-
ular, through the use of ambient displays it is possible
to cue recall, and hence reinforce learning of a wide
range of skills. For example, the acquisition of a new
language could be supported by providing appropriate
cues to facilitate recall of vocabulary. Similarly, a class
teacher could be encouraged to remember the names of
their pupils, an expatriate could better remember local
customs to ease office integration, and a study-abroad
student could learn culturally-significant facts as they
explore a new city.
2.3 Supporting Failing Memories
Research has shown that as we age, our ability to
perform uncued recall is particularly vulnerable to age-
related decline. Pervasive memory augmentation tech-
nologies could be used to help remedy this memory loss
by providing older users with time-relevant and context-
appropriate cues. In this way, older individuals could
enjoy greater self-confidence and greater independence
by being reminded of moment-by-moment situated de-
tails of where they were, what they were intending to
do, and how they could get home. They may also en-
joy better relationships if they could be reminded of the
autobiographical details of their loved ones (such as the
names and ages of their loved ones’ children), or if they
could review and then be reminded of the details of a
recent conversation or event (e.g., a recent day out or
family gathering).
2.4 Selective Recall
Through appropriate selection of memory cues that
are presented to the user, pervasive memory augmen-
tation can be used to facilitate selective recall. Ac-
cording to the psychological theory of retrieval-induced
forgetting, the act of reviewing memories not only en-
hances the probability of spontaneously retrieving these
reviewed memories in the future, but it can also attenu-
ate the spontaneous retrieval of related but unreviewed
memories. The study of retrieval-induced forgetting has
largely been confined to the laboratory using lists of cat-
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egorised words. It is of both pure and applied interest
(e.g., the desired attenuation of unwanted, outdated, or
traumatic memories; and the undesired attenuation of
wanted but unreviewed memories) to see if this phe-
nomenon can be observed when reviewing a subset of
“real world” memories, and if so, we will be able to mea-
sure the extent to which unreviewed memories could be
attenuated through selective reviewing.
2.5 Advertising
While many of the application domains for pervasive
memory augmentation technologies are for the public
good, the same technologies can also be employed in
more commercial contexts such as the provision of new
forms of advertising in which users have memories trig-
gered explicitly to drive purchasing decisions. For ex-
ample, when passing a shop selling luggage a cue could
be presented that causes a passer-by to remember a
specific experience from their past in which their own
luggage didn’t work satisfactorily. This may then cause
the user to enter the shop and purchase some new lug-
gage.
2.6 Social Acceptance
These scenarios illustrate the potential power of per-
vasive memory augmentation. While a number of news
have reported social backlash from bystanders impacted
by others’ use of image-based lifelogging devices such
as Google Glass
TM
, two observations indicate that this
may not be the restrictive factor that it first appears.
Firstly, although useful, mobile cameras are by no
means an essential data source for triggering recall – lo-
cation information is readily tracked by mobile devices
and has been shown to improve memory reconstruction
[7], other mobile sensors and non-image based lifelog-
ging devices (e.g., step counters and heart rate loggers)
can provide a wealth of relevant information, and min-
ing existing ‘fixed’ data sources such as email, social
networking, and calendar providers can also provide a
rich description of our activities. While these can cer-
tainly be just as privacy invasive as video recordings,
they don’t trigger social backlash in the same way as
image-based lifelogging devices can.
Secondly, we note that there are cultural differences
in technology acceptance, and that social preferences
often change over (fairly short) periods of time. For ex-
ample, while in some countries capture of one’s personal
image is deemed an unacceptable invasion of privacy, in
countries such as the UK the population has accepted
that the security benefits of allowing personal images
to be captured (i.e. as in CCTV) outweigh concerns
regarding privacy. Equally, early adopters of smart-
phones encountered similar negativity to that currently
targeted at some lifeloggers, as the use of smartphone
cameras in public drew concern. However, such devices
are now commonplace. Further examples can be drawn
from the range of potentially privacy-invasive applica-
tions such as activity monitors (e.g., Fitbit), location-
based services, and social networking applications that
by now have been widely adopted. Note that the actual
reasons for the gradual acceptance of these intrusive
technologies may hardly be desirable (e.g., discounting
privacy implications in favor of short-term rewards, or
a certain feeling of helplessness given the ubiquity of to-
day’s privacy invasions). Obviously, pervasive memory
augmentation devices should be designed with proper
privacy safeguards in mind (see section 4).
Our long-term vision is of a privacy-friendly technol-
ogy eco-system that uses a range of sensors and data
inputs to support augmentation of human memory in
application domains such as those described above and
that could have a transformational impact on the lives
of citizens by improving the acquisition of new knowl-
edge, the retention of existing knowledge, and the loss
of unwanted knowledge.
3. ARCHITECTURES FORMEMORYAUG-
MENTATION
Early experiments into memory augmentation focused
on architectures and systems in which experience data
was gathered by devices worn or carried by a user (Fig-
ure 1). This data could then be locally stored or up-
loaded to cloud-based servers. Different user interface
concepts were explored that allowed users to inspect
the data, typically as part of a specific review activ-
ity. There are numerous examples of such systems rang-
ing form those designed to support short term memory
(e.g., Heyes et al. [6]) to those that attempted to create
complete life logs (e.g. Gemmell et al. [4]). Many of
the early systems looked at feasibility and focused on
recording images, audio, and activities. Recently, quan-
tified self technologies such as the FitBit (www.fitbit.com)
have become commercially available that allow users to
track a range of their activities.
User Sensors
Experience Capture
Personal 
Devices
Review
Cloud Storage
Figure 1: Early Pervasive Memory Architec-
tures
However, this type of architectural approach has a
number of shortcomings. Firstly, it relies on data cap-
tured exclusively by a specific user. This seriously re-
duces the number of data streams available and the
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quality of these data streams. Consider, for example,
attempting to capture a user’s experience of a meet-
ing. Using a microphone on a mobile device in the
user’s pocket is likely to offer significantly poorer re-
sults than using a high-quality audio conferencing mi-
crophone built into the meeting room. This problem ex-
tends to a wide range of contextual and environmental
data and is particularly acute when considering interac-
tion with cloud services in which the obvious source of
the experience data is the service itself rather than an
approximation of the interaction captured by the user.
Indeed, when designing capture systems there are
several parameters that are important and that need
to be considered. For humans the visual and auditory
channels are dominant and recording these has been the
focus in many projects. In the case of visual capture
the visual field of view and the position of the camera
is important (e.g. glasses with a similar view as the
human view versus a device worn around the neck with
a lower perspective and a wide angle lens). Of course
visual capture could also be more powerful than human
vision, e.g. using cameras pointing in multiple direc-
tions, with higher temporal and special resolution than
the eye, or even recoding wavelengths the human eye
cannot see.
Capturing meta information, and most importantly
time and location, adds significant value to the data,
as it allows selective access to specific experiences cap-
tured. Examples of sensors that are useful include lo-
cation sensing, sensors that provide information about
the physical environment, but also sensors that provide
information about the users physiological state (e.g. ex-
citement or attention). For captured visual informa-
tion it may be of great value to know where the user
was looking and hence eye-gaze information is helpful
as meta-information.
Problems also arise when one considers data presen-
tation using current architectural approaches. Very few
users are able to take the time to review the memories
that are captured during the day – witness the prob-
lems most users have these days managing a relatively
small number of digital photographs. It is unlikely that
a pervasive memory augmentation system that relies on
users explicitly reviewing memories will deliver signifi-
cant value.
Instead, we believe that future systems will rely on
the ability to appropriate screen real-estate from the
large number of displays that the user already looks at
as part of their daily activities. Examples of displays
that are likely to be appropriated include public sig-
nage, personal ambient displays such as photo frames
and advertising display space embedded into applica-
tions such as Google Mail and search results. Access to
recorded experiences may take a number of forms in-
cluding: (1) using the material for specific but selective
queries where the information is helpful, (2) reviewing
a summary of the information recorded that is signifi-
cantly compressed, and (3) having the information that
is recorded presented in the periphery of the user to
stimulate specific recall.
Based on consideration of both capture and present-
ing issues it is our hypothesis that future pervasive
memory augmentation systems will form complex eco-
systems of experience capture, storage and presentation
devices rather than the user-centric approaches currently
employed. In Figure 2 we show the key building blocks
for future memory augmentation systems.
Figure 2: Pervasive Memory Architecture
4. SECURITY AND PRIVACY THREATS
Given the applications and architectures described
above it is possible to envisage a series of areas of po-
tential security and privacy threats.
4.1 Experience Provenance
Traditional experience capture systems typically use
a device attached to the user such as a Sensecam or a
health monitor. This device is assumed to be trusted
and the data it produces is considered to accurately
describe (within the constraints of the technology) the
experience of the wearer. As discussed in section 2, we
envisage a world in which many of the data streams that
constitute an individual’s memories are sourced from
devices not worn by the user, and indeed, are outside
the user’s control.
This reliance on external data sources represents an
obvious point of attack against pervasive memory aug-
mentation systems. For example, if I am using a micro-
phone in a meeting room to capture audio associated
with a meeting how do I know (without carrying out a
manual review) that the audio captured is indeed an ac-
curate reflection of what occurred in the meeting? This
problem obviously extends beyond audio to cover any
of the wide range of experience capturing sensors on
which future pervasive memory augmentation systems
are likely to rely. It is worth stressing at this point we
are not concerned with how to protect experience data
once it has been captured – we believe there is a sig-
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nificant potential for attack even before the data has
been passed though and marked as being relevant to a
specific user.
The specific challenge therefore is how do users en-
sure the provenance of the data they store as memories?
This problem is related to that of securely associating
with devices in the infrastructure which has been ex-
plored in a number of ubiquitous computing systems
(e.g. in “The Resurrecting Duckling protocol” [10] that
addressed the issue of secure transient association be-
tween devices). However, in the majority of these sys-
tems the user was connecting to a component in the
infrastructure in order to affect an observable change
(such as displaying an image on a projector or control-
ling the temperature in an office). In memory augmen-
tation systems the challenge is that the user may only
review the captured experience long after the event and
at a point at which it is essentially impossible to detect
that the original data stream was defective.
Overall we believe that it will be necessary to develop
architectural solutions that are able to provide end-to-
end guarantees for users of the provenance of data they
are using as part of their digital memories. Such solu-
tions may need to be developed specifically for memory
augmentation but it may also be possible to repurpose
solutions that are emerging in the Internet of Things
domain to cover provenance of sensor data.
4.2 Memory Protection
Once experience data has been successfully captured
and its provenance assured then this data will need to
be securely stored. At some level this represents a tra-
ditional data security challenge. However, the focus on
experience data that constitutes an individual’s memo-
ries raises a number of unique challenges. Firstly, the
data store itself is likely to highly distributed and be ac-
cessed by a wide range of third-parties, authenticated
in some way by the user. For example, numerous data
feeds will need the ability to upload data without going
via any user applications. Moreover, applications de-
signed to support recall may require access to this data
and this complex network of data producers and con-
sumers will require relatively sophisticated access con-
trol mechanisms married with very simple user inter-
faces.
The challenges of designing an appropriate access con-
trol mechanisms and associated interface increase sig-
nificantly when sharing memories is considered. For
example, in a meeting involving three people who owns
the memory of the event ? Is it necessary for each of the
people to keep their own copy of the memory and then
manage there own access controls or is it possible for a
single copy to be maintained with appropriate shared
ownership ? As the various participants chose to delete
their copies of the memory what happens when the last
interested party deletes the memory ?
Indeed, the issue of protected memories is closely re-
lated to the issue of basic data management. It is almost
certainly the case that we do not wish to remember ev-
erything – research has shown that forgetting is crucial
to our ability to recover from emotional events and that
as the number of digital assets in our lives increases so
we are developing new rituals for forgetting.
Perhaps the ultimate test of access control occurs
when we die. What should happen to our digital mem-
ories when we die? The topic of managing digital assets
after death is starting to attract significant research at-
tention. Many research disciplines are exploring the role
of digital content (typically social media) in the griev-
ing process [3] while the study of existing legal prac-
tices is highlighting challenges associated with manag-
ing digital asset ownership after death [2]. Existing re-
search has predominantly focussed on social media such
as email and social networking content, but as perva-
sive memory systems develop it seems obvious that we
will wish to have a way to express our wishes regarding
our digital memories after death. For example, we may
wish to:
• make our memories available to our children so
they can benefit from our experiences
• have our memories die with us so that we can con-
trol how people remember us
• donate our memories to science or history
Of course in practice the most likely scenario is that
we wish to employ some combination of all of the above
– some of our memories will be intensely private and we
will wish those to die with us, while many memories we
would be happy to contribute to society (perhaps after a
time-period that ensures all those individuals captured
or implicated have passed away) offering the possibility
of transferring the way we capture and study history.
Recent experiences with a variety of digital assets has
shown that inheritance, ownership and control issues
pose significant challenge, particularly with regard to
the range of stakeholders involved [2]. With respect to
memory, we anticipate that the issues of managing and
protecting our memories will be further complicated –
a key research challenge therefore is to develop mech-
anisms to enforce the wide variety of policies desired
by individuals to exercise control over access to their
memories. This research challenge incorporates techni-
cal aspects – how should such systems be engineered –
together with the need to address social and legal con-
cerns.
In developing solutions to these challenges researchers
will need to be mindful of the need to reassure potential
users that their memories will be protected not just for
the short-term but for many years. This implies a level
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of forward planning that may be incompatible with the
short-term focus of many new technology companies.
As a result solutions may involve both a technology
component and some form of certification or indepen-
dent standards process that is able to provide users with
the required confidence.
4.3 Memory Manipulation
One of the most exciting developments in the area of
pervasive memory augmentation is the fact that con-
temporary psychology theories suggest that cued recall
can be used to both re-enforce and attenuate human
memories. In practice this means that is a system is
able to cue a subset of your memories relating to an
event then it is believed that there will be a corre-
sponding decrease in your ability to recall other memo-
ries of the event. If these theories prove valid then the
security implications this gives rise to are potentially
immense. For example, imagine a pervasive memory
augmentation system that is comprised and allows at-
tackers to select which of your memories to cue and,
by extension, which to try and attenuate. Advertises
and brand management companies could pursue cam-
paigns to make users forget bad customer experiences
and “only remember the good times”. Corrupt states
could endeavour to influence entire populations while
industrial espionage companies could attempt to alter
the memory of top executives involved in complex ne-
gotiations.
Of course attempting to influence people through cu-
ing memories has always been a part of advertising and
brand management. The important new threat that
pervasive memory augmentation gives rise to is that
the cues and memories no longer need to be generic
(e.g. pictures of Christmas trees to encourage recall of
past family holidays) but can be specific to each indi-
vidual (a picture of a specific moment last Christmas,
recalled at the expense of memories of other Christmas
moments), thus leading to much more effective forms of
memory manipulation.
The key challenge we see with respect to memory ma-
nipulation is how can a user tell if their memories are
being manipulated ? In other words, how can they tell
if the memories being cued are part of the normal daily
operation of the system versus being part of a concerted
attack on their memories. To address this we suspect
that it will be necessary for solutions to enable users
to instantiate real-time monitoring of the cues that are
delivered to them to look for unusual patterns of ac-
tivity that might suggest they are under attack. In
essence such real-time monitoring would be akin to a
virus checker for a regular PC – a virus checker for our
human memories – constantly monitoring activity to
identify suspicious patterns.
4.4 Privacy of Bystanders
The widespread use of personal capture technology
would also significantly impact the privacy of bystanders.
While sensing strictly personal attributes such as one’s
location or vital signs is unproblematic, sensing and
capturing people in one’s vicinity, as well as their ac-
tions, will most likely run into social, in some cases even
legal issues.
In many jurisdictions, personal data collections are
exempt from data protection legislation. For exam-
ple, running WiFi or Bluetooth scanners on one’s own
smartphone will most likely be perfectly legal in most
countries. However, already a single photograph – while
certainly legal for personal use1 – can easily create sig-
nificant social friction in certain circumstances. Wear-
ers of Google’s augmented reality glasses often come
under social scrutiny, and a few cafes and restaurants
have already started banning the use of Glass on their
premises. The challenge is how to protect bystanders
while allowing substantial data collection for human mem-
ory augmentation.
Even more problematic is the hidden recording of au-
dio – in many countries an actual felony. The idea of
having a personal system recording one’s spoken conver-
sation would require significant legal change – unlikely,
if not even undesirable. One approach would be to fo-
cus on technologies that do not actually record anything
but instead work like simple detectors – similar to recent
Android smartphones that are able to detect a spoken
activation command to wake up. To harness such an
approach to aid personal recall, such audio detectors
would need to be programmable, in order to support
a wider range of individual words or phrases, and once
detected keeping track of their frequency only, or maybe
simply noting the time and place of detection. While
certainly not yet with legal precedence, such “audio de-
tectors” might be perfectly legal, given that they do not
allow one to attribute any detected word to a particular
speaker.
Similar technology might need to be developed for
video recording devices, so that instead of high-fidelity
video capture, only certain abstract elements of a scene
get recorded – similar to the ability of motion capture
devices such as the Kinect to create recordings of ab-
stract stick-figures. While such approaches help with
legal issues, they might still fall short of increasing so-
cial acceptance. At the outset, the use of such “vicinity
sensing” technology might be limited to those situations
in which photography is already much more accepted,
e.g., during sports (e.g., running, skiing, hiking), in
one’s car (car-cam), work meetings (with employer per-
mission), in participating museums, or around tourism
hot-spots.
1Legal exceptions of course exist, e.g., around governmental
sites or, in some countries, involving members of the police.
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Solutions in this space are likely to combine elements
of new technologies for creating abstract recordings with
a robust way of announcing recording practices and
policies to users (e.g. through the use of privacy bea-
cons [8]).
5. LOOKING FORWARD
Pervasive memory augmentation systems are likely
to become a reality in the next decade. The basic tech-
nologies for mobile and infrastructure-based experience
capture and for near-ubiquitous display of memories are
already commonplace. What is missing is an under-
standing of how to connect these components together
via an appropriate memory store to deliver value such as
the applications described in Section 2. However, this
is clearly a solvable problem and we expect systems to
emerge that provide increasingly comprehensive mem-
ory capture and recall.
While the benefits of pervasive memory augmentation
are significant, in this paper we have attempted to high-
light the challenges that such systems give rise to, par-
ticularly in the area of security and privacy. Of course,
with respect to security and privacy, pervasive memory
augmentation systems give provide new opportunities
as well as threats. For example, if pervasive memory
augmentation systems become established, then the un-
derlying capture systems could also be used to provide
additional data for context-aware authentication sys-
tems (e.g. Hayashi et al.’s CASA [5]). In such cases the
threats identified in this paper have still greater signifi-
cance as corruption of the memory traces could impact
security more broadly.
Overall, memory and knowledge on a societal level is
of great importance. Over the last 4, 000 years our way
of recording information has evolved from stone carv-
ings through printing to multimedia documents. How-
ever, despite our increasing ability to produce and store
information, our society still follows the approach of se-
lective capture and storage. Once memory augmenta-
tion systems become a mainstream technology we may
see a radical transition from selective preservation of
knowledge to preserving everything and only selectively
removing parts we find inappropriate.
We hope that this article can serve as a starting point
for significant community research activity, in order to
make progress towards an overall goal of creating safe
and effective pervasive memory augmentation systems.
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